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When the Egyptian people forced their leader from power on February 11, 2011, hopes for an ‘Arab Spring’ ran high. The ouster of Ben Ali in Tunisia just 11 days earlier was 
earth-shattering in itself, but regime collapse in the Arab world’s most populous country after 
just 18 days of protest was an event of far greater magnitude. Memories of the Egyptian 
Revolution of 1952, whose ripples would define regional politics for more than a decade, 
were fresh enough to give even the most ‘stable’ of Arab monarchies and republics pause 
for thought. The impact of this latest Egyptian ‘revolution’ is, however, conditioned by the 
extent to which genuine regime change and democratic transformation are achieved. More 
than a year later, neither prospect is assured.
THE FORCES OF REVOLUTION
The revolution of January 25, 2011 was triggered by the uprising in Tunisia. But it was the fruit of 
more than a decade of a growing culture of protest in Egypt that encompassed the labour movement, 
pro-democracy activism, and newer internet campaigns against the brutality of Mubarak’s police state.
The January Revolution brought these protest sectors together around the unifying symbol of Tahrir 
[Liberation] Square. In the heady days of January and February 2011, the movement appeared to turn 
Egypt on its head. In a country known for political stagnation, new forms of leadership and organisation 
evolved, both within Tahrir Square and around the country as citizens formed ‘popular committees’ to 
fill the security void left by the collapsing security forces. Instead of chaos, anarchy and sectarianism, 
the regime’s abdication of responsibility produced cooperation and tolerance, unity between Muslims 
and Coptic Christians, and a reinvigorated sense of civic pride. The ouster of Mubarak on February 11 
unleashed a palpable feeling of collective euphoria and unity.
Although the protests came to be identified with Facebook and Egypt’s tech-savvy middle classes 
(epitomised by the figure of Google executive Wael Ghoneim), they transcended class barriers and 
involved significant participation by the urban poor. Meeting points and times announced on Facebook 
were often decoys to enable the real demonstrations organised via word-of-mouth, a reality underscored 
by the inefficacy of the regime’s knee-jerk suspension of internet and mobile phone access.
Yet the utopian vision of Tahrir was soon tarnished. Female demonstrators were mocked and hounded 
out of the square during a march on International Women’s Day. Sectarian violence re-emerged, blamed 
by many on agents provocateurs, ‘remnants’ of the old regime. And as the numbers in Tahrir Square 
dwindled, the police returned to clear the stalwarts by force. Nevertheless, although the optimism of 
these early experiments in revolutionary leadership inexorably faded, the memory and symbolism of 
Tahrir Square – code now for revolutionary activism around the country – remains a powerful force 




Egypt’s official opposition parties, as well as the most 
powerful ‘unofficial’ opposition movement, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, were initially absent from the revolution. 
Elements of the conservative Salafi trend went so far as 
to condemn the protests as haram. The Coptic Church 
declared its opposition to the demonstrations as did, 
initially at least, the Islamic institution of al-Azhar. In 
its early days, some saw the abstention of these actors 
as evidence of the revolution’s secular character, but 
Copts and Islamists of all stripes had participated as 
individuals from the beginning. It was in large part 
a revolt against patriarchal authority, a category in 
which all established political and religious leaderships 
risked being included if they remained opposed or 
uncommitted to the revolution.
The Brotherhood and Salafi leaderships arguably felt 
they had the most to lose in supporting an uprising 
that may have been doomed to fail. But as middle 
class professionals deserted the regime in their droves, 
and masses of urban poor swarmed into the streets 
of Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and elsewhere, the cost-
benefit calculations of these leaders changed. By 
the ‘Day of Rage’ on Friday, January 28, the Muslim 
Brotherhood had stepped off the fence and was 
mobilising its members.
If Islamist organisational involvement boosted the 
strength of the protests – and ultimately helped direct 
them – the most important part in the uprising’s 
success in ousting Mubarak was played by the military. 
The protesters singled out Mubarak, his ministers 
and the clientalistic network surrounding his son 
Gamal – and not the military regime in toto – as the 
target. They invited the army to join them. Images 
of soldiers carried aloft in Tahrir Square, and tanks 
daubed with revolutionary slogans, cemented the view 
of the people and the army as ‘one hand’ against the 
Mubarak regime.
The military leadership, for its part, saw an opportunity 
to settle scores in a long-festering intra-regime feud. 
From the army’s perspective, the revolution’s most 
important dividend was to see off the potential threat 
to its economic and political prerogatives posed by 
the aggressive privatisation agenda of the Nazif 
government and Mubarak’s would-be heir, Gamal. 
Mubarak himself dismissed Nazif and his cabinet on 
January 29, a move that pleased the army but did 
little to placate the protesters. With Gamal’s faction 
gone, the army’s economic interests were safe from 
an increasingly confident new business elite who saw 
this ‘new guard’ as their main ally within the regime.
The army thus had an interest in exploiting popular 
protest, but also in containing and ultimately controlling 
the revolutionary movement. It played a double game. 
Having won a prized concession from Mubarak, the 
military allowed camel-riding thugs wielding swords 
into the square on February 2, producing one of 
the revolution’s bloodiest confrontations. While 
apparently protecting protesters against interior 
minister Habib al-Adly’s police, it was arresting 
and torturing activists itself.
But the fact that the military did not turn its full force 
against the protesters was crucial to the revolution’s 
initial successes. More positively, the high degree of 
popular prestige that the army has long enjoyed as 
a bulwark of order in Egypt gave the revolution an 
unassailably patriotic and nationalistic flavour that 
broadened the movement’s support among more 
risk-averse Egyptians. 
THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION
Mubarak’s position as leader was filled by his former 
defence minister, Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein 
Tantawi. As head of the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF) Tantawi assumed control during 
the transitional phase. SCAF moved rapidly to hold a 
referendum on amending the constitution on March 
19, 2011. The referendum, which was approved 
with 77 percent of the vote, paved the way for 
parliamentary and presidential elections.
Soon after Mubarak’s ouster, numerous new political 
parties were formed, both secular and Islamist. The 
Muslim Brotherhood established the Freedom and 
Justice Party (FJP), a vehicle consciously modelled 
after the Turkish Justice and Development Party 
(AKP). The largest Salafi grouping, Alexandria-based 
al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya, established the Nur (Light) 
Party. Islamist groups campaigned intensively for a 
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‘yes’ vote in the referendum, believing – accurately 
as it turned out – that their name recognition and 
organisational experience would serve them well in 
early elections. In elections held from November 2011 
until January 2012, these parties gained a substantial 
parliamentary majority. 
That said, it is SCAF that commands the predominance 
of hard power in Egypt. It appointed and controls the 
government of Kamal Ganzouri, as it did that of his 
predecessor Essam Sharaf. The government cannot act 
in any substantive way without SCAF approval. SCAF 
continues to set foreign and economic policy during 
the transitional phase, and controls the domestic 
security forces. 
At the same time, SCAF’s power is limited by its 
‘despotic’ as opposed to ‘infrastructural’ nature. 
Although the military as an institution is held in high 
esteem, as a governing authority SCAF has little 
popular legitimacy, and neither does it possess – nor 
is it likely to seek to develop – effective mechanisms 
of governance at the grassroots. It is for this reason 
that it has come to accept, if not depend upon, more 
socially embedded Islamists as a link between state 
and society. 
The revolution has allowed Islamists to formalise their 
position within the structure of power. With the ear 
of the SCAF, an electoral mandate, and an established 
local presence throughout the country, Islamist parties 
occupy an intermediary space between SCAF and the 
revolutionary forces. This is a precarious role to play. If 
the Brotherhood and Salafis appear too close to SCAF 
they jeopardise their popular standing. But if they are 
over-eager to flex their ‘revolutionary’ muscles they 
may alarm SCAF and its international supporters, 
and precipitate repression.  An intra-Islamist rivalry 
between the Salafis and the Brotherhood also plays 
out in the context of these tensions.
It is in disrupting this marriage of convenience that 
the revolutionary coalition becomes most significant. 
Unlike the major Islamist parties, the Tahrir forces 
lack significant parliamentary representation. They 
comprise a heterogeneous patchwork of movements 
with quite diverse political agendas. These forces are 
predominantly found within the January 25 Revolution 
Youth Coalition (I’tilaf Shabab al-Thawra). 
The Tahrir forces include, significantly, new Islamist 
parties such as the Egyptian Current (al-Tiyar al-
Misri), formed by young Brotherhood dissidents. 
Support for the revolution is not a uniformly, or even 
predominantly, ‘secular’ vocation, which makes it 
problematic to put ‘Islamists’ and ‘revolutionaries’ 
in opposing camps. The unifying commitment to 
January 25 and Tahrir as a symbol continues to provide 
alternative avenues of political expression for Islamist-
inclined Egyptians, particularly as the ‘official’ Islamist 
vehicles appear too close to SCAF and trapped within 
the old ways of doing things. Even the conservative 
Salafi movement – persistently averse to extra-Islamist 
alliances – is losing adherents to parties and groups 
within the revolutionary current.
These extra-parliamentary Tahrir forces reserve the 
option of ‘returning to the square,’ and numerous 
demonstrations have taken place since the fall of 
Mubarak. Via the official media and with recurrent 
Islamist support, SCAF has been partially successful 
in discrediting protests and portraying protesters as 
agents of foreign powers. But the fact that people 
no longer fear taking their demands onto the streets 
means that the army and Islamist parties must work 
harder to ensure popular support for their policies.
Regardless of the sociological reality, the process set 
in train on January 25, 2011 is almost unanimously 
referred to as a ‘revolution’ in Egypt. The military 
rulers celebrate the achievements of the revolution of 
the army and the people. Yet for the Tahrir forces the 
revolution remains a work in progress. Though there 
is little agreement on what completing the revolution 
would entail, some consensus exists on the importance 
of prosecuting Mubarak and others accused of killing 
protesters, and on sending the military back to barracks 
to allow civilians to take charge. Collectively, they 
channel the grievances of labour, the poor and other 
‘losers’ in Egypt’s neoliberal experiment, and push for 
a more complete break with the past.
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THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT
Meaningful democracy in Egypt is still a way off. 
Whilst the elections were generally accepted as free 
and fair for the first time since 1952, many vestiges 
of the old Egypt remain in place under SCAF. The 
state of emergency that has prevailed since Sadat’s 
assassination in 1981 is set to continue until at 
least June 2012. This enables SCAF to bypass legal 
safeguards in much the same way as did Mubarak. 
Censorship and manipulation of the media remain 
routine, and pro-democracy NGOs are vilified and 
persecuted with much the same caprice as they were 
during the Mubarak era. 
SCAF remains wedded to the idea of a strong executive 
(with a compliant president) and will seek a new 
constitution that guarantees that. It is supported in 
this aim by ostensibly ‘liberal’ parties that fear Islamist 
domination in parliament. The FJP and Nur Party each 
favour a stronger parliament, understandably given 
their high representation in that body. It remains to be 
seen whether the committee charged with drafting the 
constitution (which is to be composed of 50 percent 
MPs) will deliver a constitution to the Islamists’ liking, 
but the issue is sure to constitute an important axis 
of friction between SCAF and the Islamist parties.
A powerful parliament is not in itself, however, a 
guarantee that the military’s influence on politics will 
be curbed. As in the past, procedural trappings of 
democracy mask a resilient system of patron-client 
relations that has long underwritten political power in 
the Egypt. The electoral system, for example, does not 
reflect informed popular support for particular parties 
or political programmes. A third of seats in parliament 
continue to be allocated according to single-member 
districts, thus favouring local strongmen dependent 
on regime patronage. The retention of a quota for 
workers and peasants (opposed by Islamist parties) 
similarly facilitates the ascent of regime-favoured 
candidates, including retired soldiers and police 
officials. Such ‘safe’ seats militate against parliament’s 
independent role as part of a broader system of checks 
and balances in the Egyptian political system.
The current parliament certainly represents an 
improvement on Mubarak-era legislatures, which 
were toothless bodies dominated by the President’s 
National Democratic Party, but the FJP shares some 
of the NDP’s features and functions. The current head 
of the parliamentary Defence and National Security 
Committee, for example, ran on the Freedom and 
Justice Party’s list, but he is also a general and the 
former head of internal investigations within military 
intelligence. The dissolution of the NDP, in other 
words, does not necessarily mean the military regime 
cannot place its people in influential and sensitive 
parliamentary roles.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REVOLUTION AND 
COUNTER-REVOLUTION
Stability, and hence democracy, in Egypt depends 
largely on how the economy develops in the years 
to come. Tourism and investment are in decline and 
youth unemployment hovers at around 25 percent. 
The socioeconomic drivers of protest have not been 
alleviated. Some, but by no means all, of the January 
25 protesters opposed neoliberal economics in Egypt 
and viewed themselves as part of the broader global 
movement against capitalism and globalisation. It was 
partially under pressure from the protest movement 
that SCAF refused a package of IMF loans in 2011, 
and although the protest movement has since been 
weakened, it is far from being broken. 
In December 2011 SCAF felt able to accept a $3.2 
billion loan facility from the IMF. This reflected the 
political consolidation of the transitional phase. 
Although both the military and the Islamist movement 
gained from the removal of Gamal Mubarak and his 
neoliberal ‘change team’, neither actor promotes a 
qualitatively new economic path. The current finance 
minister, Hazem Beblawi, is known for his neoliberal 
proclivities. The FJP considers access to IMF loans to be 
an Egyptian ‘right’. Islamists, like the military, fiercely 
protect continued private investment in the economy. 
If SCAF and Islamists have come together to pursue 
their own interests and neutralise further protest, 
their relationship is not without its own challenges. 
Friction between SCAF and the Brotherhood reflects 
particularistic economic as well as political interests. 
The military has to date focussed economically on 
resource-intensive sectors such as transportation, 
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heavy industry, oil and gas, wastewater treatment, and 
food production. Egypt has seen a doubling of proven 
gas reserves, and the military now controls almost as 
much of this sector as does the Ministry of Petroleum. 
The army remains engaged in joint ventures with 
national and international firms in many enterprises. 
The Muslim Brotherhood, for its part, includes wealthy 
businessmen with significant interests in consumer 
goods and services, as well as in the financial sector. 
It too is actively seeking foreign investment and 
partnership, and has recently set up the Egyptian 
Business and Investment Association to help facilitate 
such ventures. 
Regional political and economic dynamics can satisfy 
the economic interests of both the Brotherhood and 
the military, but come with ‘counterrevolutionary’ 
strings attached. Saudi Arabia has a clear interest in 
the ‘non-exportability’ of the Egyptian revolution, and 
GCC states implicitly condition their financial support 
for both SCAF and the FJP on a commitment not to 
promote revolution elsewhere or to cave in to further 
revolutionary demands at home. The Saudis also retain 
ideological soulmates in the Egyptian Salafi movement. 
Salafism has long been nurtured as a counterweight to 
the Brotherhood, with widely asserted Saudi support, 
and remains as a second option if the Brotherhood 
disappoints – although the Salafi movement is also 
far from monolithic and may not remain as pliant an 
ally as Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies 
would like.
The political concerns of the Gulf monarchies are also 
related to ongoing economic interests in Egypt. Moves 
that appeal to the forces of Tahrir and Egyptian society 
more broadly, such as the invalidation of Mubarak-era 
privatisation deals, disadvantage not only the crony 
capitalists of the old regime, but also their international 
partners. Saudis, Kuwaitis, Qataris and others are 
naturally concerned that their existing investments 
in the Egyptian economy not be jeopardised by such 
populism. Some 700,000 Saudis live in Egypt and 
current investment in the country stands at around 
$12 billion. If cancelled deals are snapped up by the 
military or Brotherhood investors, foreign partners 
will expect to keep their share of the pie.
PROSPECTS FOR EGYPT’S POLITICAL FUTURE
Barring a major rupture, the nature of Egypt’s political 
evolution following June’s presidential elections may 
hinge on the complementarities of the military and 
Brotherhood economic portfolios, and the extent to 
which each side is willing to bargain economic for 
political privileges. For the military, this will not be 
a simple repeat of its rivalry with Gamal Mubarak’s 
‘reformists’ prior to January 2011. For one thing, 
the army will not be able to rely on another popular 
revolution to tip the balance in its favour. Gamal and 
his team had very little legitimacy within civil society 
and were reviled among the population at large. The 
Brotherhood, for its part, has an electoral mandate and 
considerably more strings to its social and political bow. 
This may help protect the Brothers from the hard 
power of SCAF as well as enable it to secure its own 
spheres of economic and political influence. It will 
struggle to wrest control over foreign and defence 
policy from the military. But the opportunity to put 
foreign policy principles, particularly toward Israel, 
into practice is one that Islamists in power may gladly 
pass up. 
The Brotherhood nevertheless has its popular standing 
to consider, and it is in this area that the revolution has 
changed the landscape. Whereas the crony capitalists 
of Mubarak’s time could ride roughshod over popular 
sentiment, being able to call on an increasingly feral 
security apparatus when needed, the Brotherhood 
faces a newly mobilised public that expects change 
and is not afraid to take to the streets to demand it. 
Islamist failure to deliver on the political and economic 
fronts will open opportunities for newer political actors 
to exploit. Though a thoroughgoing revolutionary 
outcome remains out of reach in Egypt, with key 
elements of Mubarak’s regime either still in place or 
staging comebacks, this pressure from below is a new 
and significant factor that will shape Egyptian politics 
in the years to come. ■
